Er Israelske bosættelser ulovlige ifølge international lovgivning? Svaret er klart – nej!
Der indledes med at slå fast, at Israel’s ret til at eksistere, indenfor sikre grænser, ikke er til diskussion, og at man i denne forbindelse kun behøver referere til 3 sikkerhedsrådsresolutioner, #42 (1948), #242 (1967) og #338 (1973).
Grundlaget for disse ligger i lige linje fra Balfour deklarationen (1917) over San Remo mandatet (1920) til staten Israel’s udråbelse som jødisk stat den 15. maj 1948 på basis af FN Generalforsamlingens resolution #181 (1947). Derfor skal Israel behandles som en suveræn stat på lige fod med andre suveræne stater, og de love som gælder for andre suveræne stater, skal også gælde for Israel.
Det gør de bare ikke, når det kommer til Judea og Samaria, som er omstridte områder, og ikke besatte nationalstats-områder.
Er israelske bosættelser ulovlige? Nej!
Israels rettigheder tilsidesættes groft af blandt andre europæiske anti-israelske politikere, herunder vor egen udenrigsminister, Villy Søvndal, folketingets formand, Mogens Lykketoft, og deres allierede i Enhedslisten, og de er alle hoppet med på løgnen, som er blevet en myte og af de samme anti-israelske politikere efterfølgende er ophøjet til international lov, som ellers rettelig er international løgn.
Når løgne gentages så mange gange, at de bliver til myter, og efterfølgende fuldstændig ukritisk bliver ophøjet til internationale love af anti-israelske politikere, i deres bevidste konstante forsøg på diskriminering af den jødiske nation, Israel, så er der grund til at råbe dem op.
Israels modstandere vælter sig i en ren syndflod af “Internationale love” som bare ganske enkelt ikke eksisterer. Og vælter sig i anti-israelske FN Generalforsamlingsresolutioner, som ikke er retsgyldige og slet ikke udtryk for internationale love.
Den meget respekterede og internationalt anerkendte israelske premierminister, Golda Meir sagde det således: “Hvis et flertal i FN’s Generalforsamling kunne vælge at stemme Jorden flad, for at genere Israel, så ville den gøre det” Der er lidt tvivl om hvem der brugte metaforen først, men Abba Eban, ligeledes internationalt anerkendt israelsk diplomat, politiker og udenrigsminister anvendte metaforen på et andet tidspunkt og lidt anderledes.
Vi kender alle Balfour deklarationen.
Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia
Men Balfour Memorandum fra 1919 er knap så kendt og handler om den britiske udenrigspolitik i forbindelse med opdelingen af området i britiske og franske mandater.
Om det jødiske hjemland står der: Palestine must be made available for the largest number of Jewish immigrants. It is therefore eminently desirable that it should obtain the command of the water-power which naturally belongs to it, whether by extending its borders to the north, or by treaty with the mandatory of Syria, to whom the southward flowing waters of Hamon could not in any event be of much value. For the same reason Palestine should extend into the lands lying east of the Jordan. It should not, however, be allowed to include the Hedjaz Railway, which is too distinctly bound up with exclusively Arab interests.
San Remo’s Mandate: (YouTube link) Israel’s ‘Magna Carta’
San Remo er Israels internationale charter for anerkendelsen af et jødisk hjemland i Palæstina mandatet og er en
de facto anerkendelse af, at de arabiske territorier herefter er det franske mandat Syrien, som senere bliver til Libanon og Syrien, samt det engelske Mesopotamien (Irak) og hele den arabiske halvø, som består af forskellige arabiske kongedømmer udenfor mandaterne.
Har Israel ret til at eksistere i henhold til international lov? Ja.
Har Israel ret til Østjerusalem, Judea og Samaria? Ja.
Er Israel en besættelsesmagt af land tilhørende en anden suveræn stat? Nej.
Er de israelske bosættelser ulovlige? Nej.
Er annekteringen af Østjerusalem ulovlig? Nej.
Og det står faktisk ikke til diskussion. Men derfor kan der godt forhandles ægte fred, hvor palæstinenserne gerne vil opnå en grad af selvstændighed, eller endda en tredje pal-arabisk stat. Den første var I virkeligheden Jordan. Den anden er Gaza.
Why Israel Is Not Violating Fourth Geneva Convention
Many pro-Palestine activists and members of the international community falsely have claimed that Israel has violated the Fourth Geneva Convention. For example, a UN Human Rights Council panel has declared that Israel building Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria violates the Fourth Geneva Convention. Christine Chanet, the French judge who headed this U.N. inquiry, asserted, “To transfer its own population into an occupied territory is prohibited because it is an obstacle to the exercise of the right to self-determination.” Yet any careful examination of international law would establish that Judea and Samaria, as well as East Jerusalem, are not occupied territories and that the Geneva Convention spoke of forced transfers, such as what the Nazis did, not the voluntary transfers that Israel engages in.
Firstly, Article 49 of the Geneva Convention was drafted following the Second World War, during which time millions of people were deported, displaced and massacred. In the case of the Jews and Gypsies, outright genocide was committed. Article 49 of the Geneva Convention was created in order to prevent a repeat of what happened in Europe under the malaise aggression of Nazism. For this reason, Article 49 of the Geneva Convention states, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”
The International Commission of the Red Cross clarified this article in 1958 by asserting, “It is intended to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the native population and endangered their separate existence as a race.” This establishes the point that Article 49 of the Geneva Convention refers to forced transfers of population that result in endangering a conquered nations’ existence, not voluntary settlement to open areas, even for cases when an occupation does indeed take place.
Yet, there is a strong legal case to be made that the term occupation does not even apply to Judea and Samaria, as well as East Jerusalem. Article 2 of the Geneva Convention has made clear that the Fourth Geneva Convention only applies to two or more high contradicting parties, which is not the case at hand since the international community never recognized Jordan’s annexation of Judea and Samaria. Further, Egypt never bothered to annex Gaza and no Palestinian Arab state ever existed throughout human history. However, according to the San Remo Resolution of April 25, 1920 and the Mandate for Palestine of July 24, 1922, Judea and Samaria, East Jerusalem, and Gaza were all supposed to be part of a Jewish state. These agreements are still relevant, since Article 80 of the UN Charter states that all mandates of the League of Nations are still valid.
Some people falsely believe that the Palestine Mandate was terminated in 1947, but this is not correct. According to Professor Eugene Rostow, former dean of Yale Law School, “A trust never terminates when a trustee dies, resigns, embezzles the trust property, or is dismissed. The authority responsible for the trust appoints a new trustee, or otherwise arranges for the fulfillment of its purpose.” Thus, while the Palestine Mandate ceased to exist in Israel and Jordan when Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom obtained independence, Professor Rostow claims “its rules apply still to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which have not yet been allocated either to Israel or to Jordan or become an independent state.” He claims that legally speaking, the Armistice Lines of 1949 represent nothing more than the positions the contending armies finished at the conclusion of Israel’s War of Independence.
Leading international law expert Julius Stone concurred. He asserted that Article 49 only relates to the invasion of sovereign states, a title the Palestinians never possessed. Stone also argued that the history behind the drafting of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention needs to be taken into account, especially considering how drastically different Israel’s situation in Judea and Samaria is to what existed in Europe under Nazism. He furthermore asserted, “No serious dilution (much less extinction) of native populations exists, rather a dramatic improvement in the economic situation of the local Palestinian inhabitants since 1967 has occurred.”
Since the end of World War II, no territorial dispute in the world has been defined as occupied territories, except in Israel’s case. According to Eli Hertz, in virtually every other disagreement concerning borders and territories, the most common terms applied are territorial disputes and contested borders. This is even the case for the places like the Western Sahara, Northern Cyprus, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, given the legal status of Palestine under the British Mandate, as a state to be established for the Jewish people, Israel also has stronger grounds to argue based on international law that these territories are within her national borders than any other state within the region.
By Rachel Avraham
Eugene Kontorovich • January 29, 2013 6:09 pm
The Geneva Convention is generally thought to apply to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank – that portion of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine previously occupied by the Jordan. This is important because the legal argument against settlements is that they violate Art. 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a provision which did not reflect prior international law.
Art. 2 of the Convention provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Because the West Bank was not part of the sovereign “territory of a High Contracting Party” (or of any country) in 1967, and Israel has argued that “occupation” within the meaning of the Convention can only exist in such territory. Of course, most international lawyers disagree, though in the years after 1967, some very prominent ones agreed.
What is more interesting is what people thought the provision meant before 1967, that is, before they knew the identity of the alleged violator. There is very little written on this, and few have looked at pre-1967 sources. However, one quite serious (pro-Israel) blogger has unearthed this intriguing discussion from Hans Kelsen in 1952, which clearly does not assume that the occupation of non-sovereign territory has the same consequences as the occupation of sovereign territory:
The principle that enemy territory occupied by a belligerent in course of war remains the territory of the state against which the war is directed, can apply only as long as this community still exists as a state within the meaning of international law. This is hardly the case if, after occupation of the whole territory of an enemy state, its armed forces are completely defeated to that no further resistance is possible and its national government is abolished by the victorious state. Then the vanquished community is deprived of one of the essential elements of a state in the sense of international law: an effective and independent government, and hence has lost its character as a state. If the territory is not to be considered a stateless territory, it must be considered to be under the sovereignty of the occupant belligerent, which—in such a case—ceases to be restricted by the rules concerning belligerent occupation. This was the case with the territory of the German Reich occupied in the Second World War after the complete defeat and surrender of its armed forces. In view of the fact that the last national government of the German Reich was abolished, it may be assumed that this state ceased to exist as a subject of international law.
There is a lot of research to be done in this vein. I recently came across a discussion in the U.N.’s International Law Commission from 1950, as part of the drafting of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States. There were quibbles from countries such as France about whether annexation is always banned, or whether there might be various exceptions.
In response, the Secretary observed: “It might be suggested that in order to constitute a crime under international law an annexation must be carried out through the use of armed force, with a view to destroying the territorial integrity of another State.” [See I Yearbook of Int. Law Comm. 137 (1950).]
Indeed, it was not surprising that there was some confusion and concern about the extent of an annexation norm, since as the delegates admitted, there were some “frontier adjustments” made by the Allies after WWII.
1952 legal text argues that belligerent occupation is impossible if the territory is not part of a state
Elder of Ziyon Monday, January 28, 2013
In order to sort out which interpretations of international law have been created out of whole cloth to apply only to Israel (sui generis) and which are actual international law, it is useful to look up scholarly research on international law between 1949 – when the Fourth Geneva Convention was written – and 1967.
Here is a section from Principles of International Law, by Hans Kelsen, 1952:
The principle that enemy territory occupied by a belligerent in course of war remains the territory of the state against which the war is directed, can apply only as long as this community still exists as a state within the meaning of international law. This is hardly the case if, after occupation of the whole territory of an enemy state, its armed forces are completely defeated to that no further resistance is possible and its national government is abolished by the victorious state. Then the vanquished community is deprived of one of the essential elements of a state in the sense of international law: an effective and independent government, and hence has lost its character as a state. If the territory is not to be considered a stateless territory, it must be considered to be under the sovereignty of the occupant belligerent, which—in such a case—ceases to be restricted by the rules concerning belligerent occupation. This was the case with the territory of the German Reich occupied in the Second World War after the complete defeat and surrender of its armed forces. In view of the fact that the last national government of the German Reich was abolished, it may be assumed that this state ceased to exist as a subject of international law. If a belligerent state ceases legally to exist as an effect of the defeat, as, e.g., the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the First World War, or the German Reich in the Second World War, no peace treaty or any other treaty can be concluded with this state for the purpose of transferring the territory concerned, or parts of it, to the victorious or any other state.
On the territory of the abolished state a new state or some new states may be established. This was the case with the territory of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which was the territory of two united states. On this territory the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian Republics, and part of Poland have been established. This is also the case with the territory of the German Reich on which two new states came into existence; the western German state, called the Federal Republic of Germany; and the eastern German State, called the German Democrat. Republic. But the new state or the new states, which have not been at war with the victorious state, cannot conclude a peace treaty and are not entitled to dispose of other territory but their own. That the Austrian Republic was forced to conclude a peace treaty with the Allied and Associated Powers, although this new state was not at war with the states which by their victory brought the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to dismemberment, and that the Austrian Republic was forced to dispose in this treaty of territory of the disappeared state which never was territory of the Austrian Republic, was based on the fiction that the Austrian Republic was identical with the Austrian Monarchy. In the case of the German Reich, the governments of the occupant powers maintained the fiction; that it continued to exist even after the abolishment of its last national government, and on the basis of this fiction it was assumed that the territory of the German Reich occupied by the four victorious powers was not under their sovereignty, but remained under the sovereignty of the German Reich. But the administration of the occupied territory was in no way in conformity with the rules concerning belligerent occupation.
It sounds like Kelsen is arguing that Israel wouldn’t have had any legal obligation to follow the Geneva Conventions laws of occupation in the territories. They were not considered Jordanian or Egyptian territory and they certainly weren’t “Palestinian”. To apply the humanitarian components of Geneva is proper, of course, and Israel voluntarily did so. But this sounds to me that even if you hold that the prohibition of “transfer” of a population to the territory includes voluntary relocation, that this would not apply to the West Bank or Gaza after 1967.
So would modern legal scholars say that Kelsen was wrong in 1952? Or is he only wrong retroactively, now that the rules were re-interpreted to damn Israel?
I emailed this question to a couple of well-known international law experts. One said that there was no clear rule before 1967 about the occupation or conquest of non-sovereign territory, and the rules that are bandied about today are clearly applied uniquely for Israel. The other stated that before 1967 it was “blindingly obvious” that the laws of belligerent occupation would not apply to non-sovereign territory, “exactly the opposite of what everyone says about Israel today.”
Who says international law doesn’t change? What used to be OK is now forbidden – because Israel is considered guilty at the outset.
The Legal Case for Israel
Professor Eugene Kontorovich holder foredrag om Israel og om international lov. Som han fuldstændig korrekt udtrykker det, så er Balfour deklarationen stort set både den første og næsten eneste internationale lov om det jødiske hjemland i det senere britiske palæstina-mandat. San Remo mandatet stadfæster jo Balfour deklarationen, og præciserer. At de jødiske hjemland er mandatet vest for Jordan-floden. Eugene Kontorovich er en af USA’s allermest anerkendte forskere indenfor videnskabelige analyser af forhold omkring eksisterende og ikke eksisterende international lov.
“Professor Kontorovich’s research spans the fields of constitutional law, international law, and law and economics. He has authored a series of papers that extend “transaction cost” analysis from private law to constitutional law. Prof. Kontorovich is also a leading expert on maritime piracy, universal jurisdiction and international criminal law. His scholarship has been relied on in important foreign relations cases in the federal courts, and historic piracy cases in the U.S. and abroad. He is working on a book, Justice at Sea: Piracy and the Limits of International Criminal Law, under contract with Harvard University Press”.
Levy kommissionen i Israel kom frem til nøjagtig de samme konklusioner. Judea og Samaria er ikke besat land tilhørende en anden suveræn stat, og allebosættelser er derfor legale, altså ikke som det ellers påstås ulovlige.
Judea and Samaria are not under occupation rule. This is the central finding of the “Outposts Committee” which was appointed to examine the legal status of Israel in Judea and Samaria, according to the daily Makor Rishon. The committee members, former Supreme Court Justice Edmond Levy, Circuit Judge Techia Shapira and jurist Dr. Allan Baker, this week have concluded the writing of their report which suggests adopting a new and old judicial framework regarding Israel’s status in Judea and Samaria.
The committee analyzed the historic and legal background of Judea and Samaria and concludes that the belligerent occupation approach must be discarded as reflecting Israel’s status in those areas. According to the committee’s approach, Judea and Samaria were in a judicial vacuum before the Six Day War. The reason was that the Kingdom of Jordan, which held those territories, did so against the rule of international law, and its sovereignty over them was recognized solely by Great Britain. Since Jordan was not the legal sovereign, the report argues, the territories cannot be defined as occupied in the legal sense of the word.
In addition, the committee offers a string of arguments showing that Israel itself has a legal connection to those territories, which is another reason why it is not an occupier.
The 90 page report, including addenda, discusses at length the issue of the outposts. Levy, Baker and Shapira fundamentally reject the legal line used by Attorney Talia Sasson in her report on the outposts. To their understanding, the vast majority of outposts can be defined as legal, since they are within the master planned areas of legal settlements whose establishment was approved by the government.
The committee further recommends that the Nature and Parks Authority declare thousands of acres in the Judea and Samaria as national parks, to facilitate the preservation of their environmental resources.
With the conclusion of the committee’s work the ball returns to the court of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Justice Minister Ne’eman, who ordered the report. Prior to the committee’s appointment the Attorney General informed Netanyahu that the judiciary is not obligated to follow its conclusions. Netanyahu told committee members that he wishes to read the report before deciding on his next steps.
The next phase is expected to include bringing the report before the Ministers Committee on the Settlements, but the main question remains whether Netanyahu and Ne’eman will be able to force the judiciary system to adopt its recommendations.
It should be noted that committee members belong to Israel’s judicial elite. Chairman Edmond Levy was considered unique among Supreme Court justice in his sensitivity to social issues. Techia Shapira is a sitting Circuit Judge in Tel Aviv. Dr. Allan Baker is an expert on international law and served as legal consultant to the foreign office. Among other things, he participated in formulating the Oslo Accords.
French appeals court rules Israel is not illegally occupying land
En fransk domstol kom frem til nøjagtig det samme resultat. Judea og Samaria er ikke underkastet Haag bestemmelserne om besat land tilhørende en suveræn nationalstat, og de israelske bosættelser er derfor ikke ulovlige.
Elder og Ziyon Wednesday, April 24, 2013
Dreuz reports that a French appeals court in Versailles has ruled that Israel was not acting illegally in building a light rail line across the Green Line.
The PLO must pay 30,000 euros separately to Alstom, Alstom Transport and Veolia Transport.
The PLO had argued that Israel was violating the Geneva Conventions by “transferring” citizens to the territories and destroying property, as well as a host of other claims.
The court ruled, however, Israel was acting within the Hague Regulations of how an occupier must act, “the authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”
Going beyond that, the court ruled that the Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations only apply to states, and to signatories, and the PLO is neither.
The full ruling is also at the site, but in French.
Eugene Kontorovich vurdere dommen ved den franske appeldomstol
Eugene Kontorovich • May 1, 2013 9:41 am
Dommen ved Appeldomstolen I Frankrig vurderes af professor Eugene Kontorovich, og budskabet er klart, Israel bryder ingen internationale love I Judea og Samaria.
In an important but largely ignored case, a French Court of Appeals in Versailles ruled last week that construction of a light rail system in the Israeli-controlled West Bank by a French company does not violate international law. In doing so, the court sided with many of the arguments long made against the blanket application of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions to Israeli settlements. National courts rarely if ever address such issues, and thus the decision is important both for its rarity and for what it says.
In this post, I’ll address issues relevant to the substance – Israel’s presence in the West Bank. In the next post I’ll deal with the “Kiobel” issues raised by the case – corporate liability, the value of American ATS cases, and so forth. I should note at the outset that what follows is based on a rough translation of the opinion and my vague French; I would be grateful for corrections on matters of language that I have misapprehended. I venture forward because it is an important decision that deserves attention, yet has been met by complete silence by international legal scholars.
The Jerusalem Light Rail, which began running last year after a long period of construction, links the Western part of the city with the parts occupied by Jordan prior to and annexed by Israel after the 1967 War. The project was widely criticized by pro-Palestinian groups, as was the participation of French rail companies in the project. Along with a variety of political pressure and boycott activities, a Palestinian group sued the French-based multinational conglomerate Alstom Transport for its role in in the project. The case was dismissed below in 2011, and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision last week.
Crucially, the Court held that only the Government of Israel, and not private parties, can violate the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The arguments that Israeli communities in the West Bank violate international law start with Art. 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer its civilian population into the territory it occupies.” The provision was also relied on heavily in the lawsuit. The Court ruled that 49(6) only speaks to and applies to action by the Israeli government (“the Occupying power”), and does not regulate Alton’s activities in the occupied territory.
This is an extraordinarily important holding in light of the decades old-debate about the meaning of 49(6) in the context of Israeli civilian migration into the West Bank. It is in direct opposition to the political and international law position on settlements. In the standard narrative, any migration of Israeli Jews past the Green Line, or the expansion of their residences and communities once there, is a war crime. Thus when private citizens decides to buy or build a house across the Green Line, or even expand an existing one, it is a war crime.
Moreover, Israeli citizens who migrate to the West Bank are often said to be guilty of war crimes themselves as aiders-and-abettors. The Versailles decision would seem to reject such a position.
This conventional reading of 49(6) as generally banning Jewish settlements is disconnected from the text, which only speaks of “transfers” carried out by the Government. Some scholars, including myself, have long maintained that private movement of persons is in no way covered by 49(6), and the Court apparently adopts this position (though I am unclear how much of a role domestic legal principles played). Now one might say the government is always “involved” – roads, security, zoning, etc., but ubiquitous “background” roles do not trigger the state action doctrine in U.S. constitutional law, and it is not clear why they would under international law. (On the other hand, if one gets a package bus/light rail ticket, it would be an unusual literal case of “transfer” into occupied territory.)
Indeed, the French case would be a strong one for inferring governmental role, since the defendant worked under contract with Israeli governmental entities. My understanding of the Court’s opinion is a little fuzzy here, but it seems they say contractual privity is not enough to trigger 49(6) either. This would certainly make it inapplicable to the vast majority of Israeli settlers (not all, necessarily, since 49(6) is ultimately a case-by-by-case factual question.
The Court goes on the reject the notion that the relevant norms have become customary or jus cogens and apply without the particular textual restrictions of 49(6).
Israel’s critics have long claimed that “everyone agrees” that all “settlements” (a term referring to all Israeli activity in the West Bank, at least that benefits Jews) clearly violates international law, and that only Israeli apologists could believe the arguments to the contrary. I assume the Versailles Court of Appeals won’t be accused of being unduly sympathetic to the Jewish State.
Indeed, many might share my surprise on such a decision coming from a European court, especially given the supposed uniformity of views on the underlying legal issues. Perhaps two factors may explain the surprising decision: this is not an international court, but an ordinary municipal one, and it was an important French industrial concern, rather than Israel, in the dock. International lawyers may what could positively be described as professional or scientific knowledge of the matter, or more cynically as guild orthodoxy. Judges unversed in these verities might see things differently. And of course, here international law is being used against important and powerful domestic interests.
The plaintiffs could still appeal to the Cour de Casssation, which however is not obligated to hear the appeal.
Og dette bekræftes yderligere af en artikel i Algemeiner
Algemeiner skriver den 4. marts 2013 i en artikel af Daniel Mandel nedenstående, hvoraf konklusionen- og opfordringen til Israel er:
“Det er derfor ikke nok, at Israel gentager loven. Man må udforske mulighederne, nye såvel som gamle – fremskaffe autorative juridiske udtalelser, arbejde for at opnå en resolution i den amerikanske kongres om
emnet., forsøge at få demokratiske regeringer til at tage afstand fra radbrækkelse af Artikel 49, nøje gendrive enhver modsat påstand fra regeringer og internationale organisationer, for nu at nævne nogle stykker – for at forhindre at dagens absurditet bliver til morgendagens er klærede lov”
Daniel Mandel “The Myth of Jewish Settlements in International Law”.
Den omtaler bl.a. den israelske juridiske professor Ruth Gavison og har bl.a. flg. at sige om lovgivningen generelt :
“Yet, as absurd as the idea is, Gavison points to something nonetheless real that highlights a general problem for free societies, not merely Israel: time does tend to work in favor of processes of legal perversion, when new, sometimes scarcely-known, treaties or “norms” are increasingly given standing by transnational forums and courts with little interest or sympathy for the values and interests of free societies.
The day arrives thus when a new legal fact has been created, no matter how absurd or noxious. In respect of Article 49, that day hasn’t arrived, but Palestinian agitprop is working on it.
Therefore, it is not enough for Israel to restate the law. It must explore avenues old and new – commissioning authoritative legal opinions, working to obtain a US Congressional resolution on the subject, seeking repudiation by democratic governments of the mangling of Article 49, detailed refutation of each and every contrary assertion by governments and international organizations, to name several – to prevent today’s absurdity becoming tomorrow’s settled law.”
Med andre ord, endnu en bekræftelse af, at løgnen er blevet en myte og af de anti-israelske politikere efterfølgende er blevet ophøjet til ikke eksisterende “internationale love”, men reelt er udtryk for “internationale løgne”.
Israel er nemlig en suveræn stat og Israel er ikke en ulovlig besætter af omstridt land
It is hard to argue with the fact that James Baker, former US Secretary of State, was not the best friend of the Jewish state. However, he categorically rejected the mislabeling of the lands of Yesha. This happened at the Middle East Insight Symposium in Washington on May 4, 1998. Hoda Tawfik, from the newspaper Al Ahram asked him, “What do you think is right? That these are occupied Arab territories and not disputed territories?” Baker replied, “They’re clearly disputed territories. That’s what Resolutions 242 and 338 are all about. They are clearly disputed territories.”
Link til artiklen på engelsk: The Legality of Israeli Settlements
Oversat af Mette Thomsen
Som følge af kritik har Church of Scotland [Kirken i Skotland] indvilget i at ændre sin kontroversielle komitérapport, som opfordrede til politisk handling, herunder boykot og ophør af investeringer i Israel, på grund af “ulovlige bosættelser i de besatte områder.” Selvom Kirken har gjort det klart, at den aldrig har anfægtet Israels ret til at eksistere, har den med sin rapport på ny rejst to problemer: Israels hævdelse af at eje bestemte områder i kraft af oprettede bosættelser; og de interesser palæstinenserne har i de “besatte palæstinensiske områder.”
Hvorvidt de israelske bosættelser er umoralske eller politisk ukloge eller udgør en hindring for enhver fredsproces, kan diskuteres. Men det, der har været vigtigst for mange i det internationale samfund, er spørgsmålet om bosættelsernes illegalitet ifølge international lov. Herom kan der siges to ting. Det ene er, at man fra starten må forstå, at hele problematikken i realiteten ikke drejer sig om legalitet, men indgår som et vigtigt element i de politiske faktorer: territorialstriden mellem Israel og palæstinenserne og andre arabere om nogle områder, som begge parter gør krav på; spørgsmålet om hvem der har lovfæstet suverænitet over områderne; en palæstinensisk stat; og Israels ønske om sikkerhed. Det andet er, at der ikke eksisterer nogen klar og alment accepteret, international lov vedrørende spørgsmålet om bosættelserne.
Mange resolutioner i internationale fora har anset bosættelserne for ulovlige. Den seneste kritiske rapport blev præsenteret i januar 2013 af et panel sammensat af FN’s Råd for Menneskerettigheder [United Nations Human Rights Council]. Dette panel, bestående af tre dommere med Christine Chanet fra Frankrig i spidsen, besluttede, at bosættelserne krænker den 4. Genevekonvention fra 1949. Desuden udtalte dommer Chanet, at Israels handlinger ifølge Artikel 8 i Den Internationale Domstol, ICC’s vedtægter må betegnes som “krigsforbrydelser.”
Det er rimeligt at udvise en passende respekt, om ikke total ærbødighed, over for både den historiske og den politiske kontekst på to felter: de relevante internationale aftaler; og de faktiske forhold [facts on the ground]. Den yderst vigtige San Remo-traktat fra 1920, som nedfældede Folkeforbundets [League of Nations] vedtægter, handlede om det nylig kollapsede osmanniske imperiums landområder og skabte en politisk konstruktion i et geografisk område, som den kaldte for “Palæstina.” Dette mandat blev af Folkeforbundet tildelt England i 1922. Mandatets Artikel 6 fastslog, at administrationen i Palæstina, i realiteten England, “skal opmuntre til tæt, jødisk bosættelse i landet, herunder på statsejet jord som ikke er påkrævet til offentlig brug.” Der tales ikke om jødiske bosættelser på den østlige bred, fordi englænderne allerede dér havde skabt en helt ny institution, nemlig emiratet, det senere kongedømme Jordan.
Palæstinamandatet anerkendte det jødiske folks historiske forbindelse til Palæstina og opfordrede til etableringen af et nationalt hjem for det jødiske folk, uden at definere grænserne. Den såkaldte “Grønne Linje” er ikke en grænse, men er det sted, hvor de kæmpende hære indstillede kampene og accepterede en våbenhvile i krigen 1948-49. Den har ingen administrativ, geografisk eller topografisk betydning.
En forenklet definition på en israelsk bosættelse er et beboelsesområde opført øst for den Grønne Linje. Hermed ignorerer man eksistensen af jødiske bosættelser før staten Israels oprettelse. Disse omfatter andre, flere hundrede år gamle bosættelser så som Hebron, det jødiske kvarter i Jerusalem, foruden dem der blev grundlagt under det britiske mandat, så som Neve Ya’acov, nord for Jerusalem, Gush Etzion-blokken på Vestbredden, nogle nord for Det Døde Hav og Kfar Darom i Gaza-regionen. Den eneste politiske myndighed, som forbød jødisk bosættelse, var den jordanske regering, som mellem 1949 og 1967 erklærede at have annekteret Vestbredden.
Denne forenklede definition ser også bort fra de mange typer af bosættelser. Nogle udgør små landbrugssamfund og grænselandsbyer; andre er urbane forstæder eller byer, så som Modi’in Illit, Maale Adumim og Betar Illit, med en anselig befolkning. Nogle er blevet anlagt af sikkerhedshensyn. Et betydeligt antal er udposter, små uautoriserede bosættelser, nogle få mobile hjem, sædvanligvis placeret på en bakketop.
I øjeblikket findes der godt 121 bosættelser og mere end 100 uautoriserede udposter. Det østlige Jerusalem og de nærliggende blokke på Vestbredden, Givat Zeev og Maale Adumin, ligger på den vestlige side af linjen. Israel trak alle bosættere tilbage fra Sinai i 1982 og de 8.000 bosættere fra Gazastriben i 2005. Omkring 534.000 personer bor nu i bosættelserne, som optager mindre end 3% af det omstridte landområde.
Kritikerne af bosættelserne har altid henvist til Artikel 49 i den Fjerde Genevekonvention. De kontroversielle fortolkninger af denne i forbindelse med Israels handlinger er dybt ironiske set i lyset af det faktum, at den blev vedtaget for at forhindre forbrydelser svarende til nazisternes deportationer af europæiske jøder med henblik på disses død. Artikel 49 (1) forbyder “Tvangsmæssige forflyttelser af individer eller grupper såvel som deportationer af beskyttede personer fra besat område til den besættende magts territorium eller et hvilket som helst andet lands, det være sig besat eller ej.” Desuden fastslår Artikel 49 (6), at “Den besættende magt må ikke deportere eller forflytte dele af sin egen civilbefolkning til det territorium, som den holder besat.”
Vedrørende dette argument kan der anføres flere ting. Som det første og vigtigste må anføres, at ingen israelere bliver deporteret eller forflyttet til bosættelserne; af forskellige årsager flytter israelere ud til dem frivilligt. Nogle udspringer af økonomiske faktorer, hvor bosætterne drager fordel af offentlige og private incitamenter og fordelagtige lån. Andre er foranledigede af religiøse medlemmer af Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful/De Troendes Blok), der opfatter sig selv som jøder, der vender tilbage til det bibelske, jødiske hjemland.
Bosættelsesområderne befinder sig hverken under nogen stats legitime suverænitet eller på privatejet, arabiske jord. Hensigten med dem er heller ikke at fortrænge arabiske indbyggere, ej heller har de nogensinde gjort dette. Dette blev demonstreret i 2012 af den israelske højesteret, da denne påbød evakuering af bosættere fra ulovlige beboelser i Ulpana, en uautoriseret udpost i udkanten af Beit El.
For det andet bliver ingen palæstinensiske arabere deporteret fra det sted, hvor de bor, hen til et andet sted. For det tredje er der ingen forbrydelser, for slet ikke at tale om “krigsforbrydelser,” blevet begået.
For det fjerde gælder Genevekonventionen teknisk set for handlinger begået af en underskriver “udført på en andens territorium.” Artikel 49 taler om “High Contracting Party” [kontraktunderskrivere på højt plan] med et suverænitetskrav på territoriet. Vestbredden, som Eugene W. Rostow fastslog i en artikel den 23. april 1990, “er ikke et territorium tilhørende en underskrivende magt, men en ikke-tildelt part af det britiske mandat.”
De konkurrerende krav fra Israel og palæstinenserne og andre arabere kan kun afgøres gennem fredelige forhandlinger. Hvis palæstinenserne kan gøre legitime krav på de omstridte områder, så kan Israel også i kraft af sin historiske og religiøse tilknytning. Det internationale samfund synes at have glemt de klare udtalelser i de forskellige våbenhvileaftaler fra 1949, som tilkendegav, at våbenhvilelinjerne “ikke fastlægges i nogen forstand som politiske eller territoriale grænser.” Ingen foranstaltninger i disse aftaler var på nogen måde ment til at foregribe parternes rettigheder og krav i “den endelige fredelige løsning på Palæstina-problemet.” Den israelske tilstedeværelse i de omstridte områder er lovlig indtil indgåelsen af en fredsaftale, for Israel bevægede sig lovligt ind i dem i selvforsvar.